Review of \u3cem\u3eThe History and Philosophy of Social Science\u3c/em\u3e by S. Gordon by Davis, John B.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications Economics, Department of
4-1-1993
Review of The History and Philosophy of Social Science
by S. Gordon
John B. Davis
Marquette University, john.davis@marquette.edu
Published version. Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 59, No. 4 (April 1993): 835-836. DOI. © 1993
Southern Economic Association. Used with permission.
BOOK REVIEWS 835 
the LLR aid has been provided at greatly subsidized interest rates, needlessly adding to the cost of the TLTF 
policy. Accordingly, Kaufman takes the view that effective reform of deposit insurance also requires reform 
of both LLR and TLTF policies. 
It has frequently been argued that accounting techniques have played a significant part in the interaction 
of depository institutions and federal deposit insurance and regulation. The last two papers in this book 
focus on the attributes of market-value accounting. The paper by William Beaver, Srikant Datar, and Mark 
Wolfson take the position that it is unclear that, given the closure track record of regulators in this country, 
market-value accounting would necessarily improve the efficiency with which financial institutions are regu- 
lated. In the paper by George Benston, Mike Carhill, and Brian Olasov, empirical evidence is provided to the 
effect that even very generic forms of market-valuation are preferred to the traditional accounting principles. 
This is a book of articles is written by distinguished researchers. It is a significant contribution that 
increases our knowledge and broadens our perspectives on an important policy issue. It should be required 
reading for all persons having a serious interest in making our financial system work better. 
Richard J. Cebula 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
The History and Philosophy of Social Science. 
By Scott Gordon. London and New York: Routledge, 1991. Pp. x, 690. $125.00. 
This is a rare and masterful book that will doubtless constitute a key resource for many future scholars. 
Scott Gordon has produced a most erudite survey of the fundamental issues involved in the development of 
social science, including economics, sociology, history, and political science. His orientation on his subject, 
he tells us, is "to maintain a strong focus on the flow of theoretical ideas in the history of social science, 
and to connect that history with issues in the philosophy of the subject" [p. viii]. Thus the book does not 
attempt to comprehensively survey all identifiable contributions to social science, but rather seeks to explain 
the broad strategies of explanation adopted since the Enlightenment to extend natural science methodologies 
to the analysis of society. This makes the issue of the differences between natural and social science a central 
theme of Gordon's book, and one that he treats with considerable skill and perception across a variety of 
subjects and individuals. 
But much more of methodological and philosophical import occupies this history as well. This is most 
evident in the book's system of organization which alternates chapters relating important historical episodes 
(e.g., Chapter 5, "Physiocracy: The First Economic Model," Chapter 7, "The Scottish Enlightenment of 
the Eighteenth Century," Chapter 9, "Classical Political Economy," and Chapter 11, "Utilitarianism") with 
systematic chapters investigating underlying themes and methodologies (Chapter 6, "The Methodology of 
Modelling," Chapter 8, "Progress and Perfection," and Chapter 10, "The Idea of Harmonious Order"). The 
effect of this strategy of organization is to impress upon the student of individual contributions the theoretical 
contexts in which ideas operate. The book can also be read selectively across its systematic chapters with 
reference to historical contributions as necessary (one must not overlook, however, systematic sections that 
fall within the contributions chapters). 
For economists of more theoretical orientation the book possesses two related virtues. On the one 
hand, Gordon shows special interest in economic ideas and considerable sophistication in their explanation 
(Gordon was trained as an economist). Historians of economic thought will rarely find judgments in his pages 
to dispute, and indeed the chapters on the history of economic thought in the book are sufficient to constitute 
a text in themselves. On the other hand, because the book approaches economics from the perspective of 
the theoretical development of social science, it offers insight to economists who have not asked themselves 
what their discipline shares with other social sciences. This latter contribution should not be underestimated. 
Perhaps the dominant theme of the 1991 centenary issue of the Economic Journal devoted to short essays 
by noted economists regarding the next one hundred years of economics was that economics as a field is 
likely to diversify through a process of specialization that appropriates ideas and themes from beyond the 
traditional purview of the subject. Indeed, casual inspection of recent Nobel Prizes in economics provides 
evidence of this. Thus Gordon's book, in emphasizing common concerns and problems social scientists have 
confronted in attempting to explain social behavior, provides a valuable opportunity for reflection on the 
goals economists pursue, all too often unconsciously. 
Of particular interest to economic methodologists is Gordon's final chapter, "The Foundations of 
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Science" that includes sections entitled "The philosophy of science" and "The study of social phenomena." 
Gordon begins by noting that though practicing scientists have generally claimed to have made rapid progress 
in their respective fields in recent decades, paradoxically philosophers and methodologists have struggled 
over seemingly intractable confusions and dilemmas in the epistemology of science. Recalling an earlier 
discussion of the goals of progress and perfection in political theory and social philosophy, Gordon suggests 
that the philosophy of science has also been torn over whether to demand certainty for scientific knowl- 
edge, or allow that objectivity and progress are possible in science without it. He then recounts the recent 
history of the rise and fall of positivism in a discussion that culminates with a survey of the bewilderingly 
diverse contemporary range of epistemological theories of science (including among economic methodolo- 
gies, instrumentalism, rhetorical analysis, evolutionary views, Kuhn, Lakatos, and the 'strong programme' 
sociology of science). From this vantage point, the theory that Gordon has himself come to, cognitive 
instrumentalism, is explained and defended. 
This epistemology sets up no specific science as representing the ideal, and makes limited prescriptive de- 
mands that can, in principle, be satisfied by scientific investigation in all domains. According to cognitive 
instrumentalism, theories and empirical data must function as complementary implements of investigation, 
and the only rules that must be followed are that theories hould be coherent and logically sound, and ar- 
ticulate with observation data that are objectively obtained and properly processed. Except for those who 
reject empiricism, these are rules that are, in fact, accepted as binding by social as well as natural scientists 
[p. 639]. 
Much could be said about this characterization which is broad and open-ended. Its appeal for Gordon, 
clearly, lies in its capacity to both include a vast array of investigations of social behavior in the framework 
of social science, and to put natural science and social science on essentially the same footing, while of 
course allowing for their unmistakable differences. 
These differences-seen from the perspective of the distinctive concerns and requirements of social 
science-are of course Gordon's fundamental preoccupation in his long and interesting book. Thus, in 
closing, and in response to skeptical views about the scientific credentials of the social disciplines, Gordon 
addresses what he believes to be three crucial issues in the philosophy of social science, which his cognitive 
instrumentalism enables him to evaluate. First, in regard to the relation between natural science and social 
science, Gordon concludes that "recognition of the ontological distinctiveness of social systems does not 
mean that there is an epistemic difference between the social and natural sciences" [p. 644]. Second, in 
regard to the epistemic status of mental states and the debate between individualism and holism, Gordon con- 
cludes that "reference to introspectively known mental states is serviceable in rendering social phenomena 
intelligible" [p. 649], and that there exists between methodological individualism and a holism attributing 
purposes and objectives to society a third view that holds "societies belong to a distinct ontological category" 
whose defining property is the principle of organization [p. 658]. Finally, regarding the problem of objec- 
tivity, Gordon notes the more intimate relationship between social science and values, but concludes that 
objectivity, "like certainty, must be regarded as a philosophical ideal rather than a characterizing property 
of scientific knowledge [p. 666]. 
This brief summary, however, hardly does justice to the richness of Gordon's effort. The book deserves 
patient reading and regular use as a reference. 
John B. Davis 
Marquette University 
Educating Economists. 
Edited by David Colander and Reuven Brenner. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992. Pp. 
x, 294. $42.50 cloth, $15.95 paper. 
Because of their concerns about how new economists are educated and trained, the members of the A.E.A. 
Executive Committee created the Commission on Graduate Education in Economics (COGEE) in early 1988. 
After surveying economics faculty and graduate students in Ph.D. granting departments, the commissioners 
offered their analysis and recommendations at the 1990 A.E.A. meetings. 
This anthology, which derives from a 1990 conference at Middlebury College on the education of 
economists, provides another set of diagnoses and prescriptions. Although it shares a number of conclusions 
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